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Usando a excessiva volatilidade macroeconômica em países da América Latina e a possível 
contribuição das políticas monetária e fiscal para tal volatilidade como motivação, este trabalho 
examina a hipótese de estes países praticarem políticas fiscal e monetária pro-cíclica. Em 
contraste com a literatura anterior considera-se aqui a possibilidade de determinação simultânea 
entre política macroeconômica e crescimento do PIB, utilizando estimações de métodos de 
momento generalizados e VARs. Adicionalmente, explora-se o impacto direto que fluxos de 
capital internacional pode ter na adoção destas políticas. A evidência sugere que, para o grupo 
de países examinados e no período de análise, a maioria praticou políticas desestabilizadoras, e 
que o fluxo de capital externo influenciou consistentemente as políticas na direção pro-cíclica. 
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  Classificação JEL: E59, E62, F39 
Abstract 
 
Using the excessive macroeconomic volatility experienced in Latin America, and the possible 
contribution of monetary and fiscal policies to this outcome, as motivation, this paper examines 
whether procyclical fiscal or monetary policy is practiced in four Latin American countries. In 
contrast with previous literature, this paper considers the possible simultaneity between policy 
and GDP growth by using GMM econometric techniques. Additionally, this paper explores the 
direct impact international capital inflows have on these policies. Our evidence suggests that for 
this group of countries, most practice destabilizing fiscal and monetary policy and that capital 
inflows consistently influence policy in a procyclical direction. 
Keywords: Fiscal and Monetary Policies; Capital Flows; Latin America 
JEL Classifications: E59, E62, F39 
 
                                                           
° We would like to thank Steve Fazzari, Franz Hamann, James Morley, Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel, and 
participants of the Applied Time Series Research Group at Washington University, the Federal Reserve 
Bank of Atlanta’s Conference on Strategies for Implementing Monetary Policy in the Americas, and the 
Fourth Annual Missouri Economics Conference. The views expressed here are those of the authors alone 
and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Central Bank of Brazil. Silva would like to also acknowledge 
the financial support of the Central Bank of Brazil and the Brazilian Council for Scientific and 
Technological Research. The usual disclaimer applies. 
* Corresponding author: Department of Economics, University of Manitoba, Winnipeg, MB, Canada  
R3T 5V5, PHONE: 204-474-9520. I. Introduction 
Do Latin American countries engage in destabilizing fiscal and monetary policy? Do 
international capital flows influence this policy choice? At first pass, it is hard to imagine 
that policy makers would engage in actions which exacerbate recessions and make for a 
tougher economic climate for their citizens and themselves. Literature on this notion is 
fairly recent however it is suggestive that governments in these countries are attempting to 
maximize their interest when engaging in this sort of policy. This is especially the case 
with fiscal policy. When faced with financial constraints or incomplete financial markets, 
often a developing country’s best option is to spend according to their revenue. While 
developing country governments might like to use fiscal policy to counteract temporary 
reductions in GDP, they are simply unable to find the needed finance. 
The literature also suggests that developing countries, especially Latin American, 
experience far more macroeconomic volatility than developed economies, and that 
economic fluctuations in developing countries impose a significant welfare loss to these 
nations. Important for our purposes, the literature also suggests that the reaction of fiscal 
and monetary policies to these shocks may exacerbate this volatility. 
We identify two problems in this literature and focus on addressing them in this paper. 
First, the empirical literature on procyclical fiscal and monetary policy is mainly 
descriptive, and so additional empirical work such as ours serves to expand this literature. 
Secondly, the small number of empirical papers typically use ordinary least squares for 
their estimations.
1 However procyclical behavior implies that fiscal and monetary policies 
also affect economic growth, creating the problem of endogenous regressors. While the 
literature has identified procyclical policy, there exists the possibility endogenous 
regressors may have created biases in existing conclusions. 
We attempt to deal with the problem of endogenous regressors by trying to identify 
exogenous variation in growth using a “sophisticated” post hoc principle. More 
specifically we use generalized method of moments (GMM) with instrumental variables 
(IV) to investigate the contemporaneous correlation, and Vector Autoregression models 
(VAR) to deal with the dynamic relationship, between policy and economic growth in four 
Latin American countries. Using these approaches, we avoid the problem of simultaneous 
determination of right and left hand side variables. In order to contrast our Latin American 
results we also engage in a “control group” exercise of sorts by empirically testing for 
procyclical fiscal and monetary policy in two developed countries (the US and UK).   
Our results indicate that most of the developing countries studied engage in procyclical 
fiscal and monetary policy, even when controlling for endogenous regressors. This is in 
line with results in the earlier literature. We find, however, that in contrast with this 
previous literature, our evidence suggests Chile implements countercyclical fiscal policy. 
Interestingly we also find both the US and UK follow countercyclical fiscal policy while 
the latter engages in countercyclical monetary policy as well. 
A second issue with previous research on this topic concerns the main cause of procyclical 
policy. Even though the theoretical literature generally considers financial constraints as 
the basis for procyclical fiscal policy, part of this literature indicates that volatility in 
international capital flows is the primary reason for destabilizing fiscal policy. 
Furthermore others suggest that procyclical fiscal policy is a result of misallocation of 
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  1resources, where developing country governments fail to generate enough surpluses during 
good times to be used during downturns. 
To investigate the role of capital flows on policy decisions, we estimate the direct impact 
capital flows have on fiscal and monetary policy decisions. Once policy behaves in a 
procyclical way, the relation between capital flows and policy decisions however may not 
be unidirectional. Therefore, in order to avoid the problem of endogenous regressors, we 
again employ GMM estimation as well as VAR models. Our results indicate that with few 
exceptions, international capital flows have a direct impact on policy decisions in a way 
that leads to procyclical policy.  
This remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section II provides a survey of the 
literature on procyclical capital flows and procyclical fiscal and monetary policy. Section 
III details the econometric methodology and empirical results, while section IV concludes 
and provides some discussion on policy implications. 
II. Literature Review 
Procyclical Capital Flows 
The literature on procyclical fiscal policy is well developed and encompassing, while the 
literature on procyclical monetary policy is at an earlier stage (but growing quickly). What 
follows provides a brief overview of the literature as well as intuition for why policy might 
be procyclical.  
We begin however with a quick summary of the literature on procyclical capital flows. A 
number of recent papers investigate the issue of capital flows and the stage of the business 
cycle in developing countries. Research in this area includes Aghion, Bacchetta, and 
Banerjee (1999a, 1999b), Calvo and Reinhart (1999), Caballero (2000, 2002), Gourinchas, 
Valdes, and Landerretche (2001), Fernandez-Arias and Panizza (2001), Ocampo (2002, 
2003), Eichengreen (2003), Ffrench-Davis (2003), and Calderon and Schmidt-Hebbel 
(2003).  
While differences certainly emerge from these papers in terms of the underlying causes, 
the basic story ties international capital flows to the business cycle, where international 
capital flows influence, and are influenced by, the business cycle in developing countries. 
In general, capital tends to flow towards countries experiencing strong economic growth, 
thus reinforcing the existing expansion. However, once the economy starts to slow down, 
so too does capital, thus assisting in the economy’s decline. Therefore when times are 
good, international capital is widely available, but when times are bad, access to capital is 
essentially shut off.  
 
A response might be, what about the role of domestic capital? For developing countries of 
the sort affected by procyclical capital flows, the problem often exists of underdeveloped 
domestic financial markets, and thus a reliance on external finance. Therefore we see these 
countries are reliant on foreign capital flows, but can only count on these flows during 
strong economic times. As well we see that while the stage of the business cycle certainly 
impacts the availability of international capital, the availability of international capital also 
seems to play an important role in the economy’s ups and downs. 
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The literature on procyclical fiscal policy is extensive, and most attention has focused on 
the role of financial constraints in promoting procyclical fiscal policy. Papers in this area 
include Aizenman, Gavin and Hausman (1996), Gavin and Perroti (1997), Catao and 
Sutton (2002), Riascos and Vegh (2003), and Kaminski, Reinhart, and Vegh (2004). The 
basic premise is that during bad economic times, many developing countries no longer 
have access to international capital and thus are unable to run deficits to engage in 
countercyclical fiscal policy. During good times, developing country governments can 
borrow more easily as international capital markets now become accessible, and so 
governments increase spending while they have the opportunity.  
While the financial constraint explanation for procyclical fiscal policy is intuitively 
appealing, it does beg a few questions. As Alesina and Tabellini (2005) point out, why do 
countries not simply accumulate reserves during good times when capital markets are 
open to them, for use when bad times hit and capital markets are essentially closed? 
Secondly, why would international lenders not lend to developing countries during 
recessions when they know having access to capital during these periods would help 
reduce their business cycle fluctuations (Alesina and Tabellini, 2005, pp. 3-4)? It is 
questions like these which have led the literature to consider alternative explanations. 
One alternative explanation focuses on the role of government misconduct or weak 
institutions in developing countries. Papers such as Talvi and Vegh (2000) and Calderon 
and Schmidt-Hebbel (2003) raise this possibility. Another more recently developed 
alternative emerges from Alesina and Tebellini (2005) who argue that procyclical fiscal 
policy is due to the incentives faced by voters and less than benevolent governments. More 
specifically, they argue that with corrupt governments, voters are concerned that 
government will extract “rents” during good times through unproductive spending. As a 
result voters demand government tax cuts and increased productive spending during these 
good times in order to help prevent this government expropriation of rents. This therefore 
leads to the sort of procyclical fiscal policy exhibited across many developing countries. 
Procyclical Monetary Policy 
The literature on procyclical monetary policy in developing countries is less developed 
than the procyclical fiscal policy literature. Papers in this area include Calvo and Reinhart 
(2000), Carvalho (2000), Gomez (2001), and Calderon and Schmidt-Hebbel (2003).  Two 
main explanations emerge regarding why developing countries may exhibit procyclical 
monetary policy. The first focuses on the role of exchange rates in determining monetary 
policy. As discussed by Calvo and Reinhart (2000), countries fear floating exchange rates 
due to their effects on inflation, and therefore employ a managed float which makes 
monetary policy a function of capital movements. During times when international capital 
is attracted to the domestic economy, countries are forced to lower interest rates to offset 
the effect of this inflow on the exchange rate, and during times when international capital 
leaves the economy, countries are forced to raise interest rates in order to defend the value 
of the currency. This therefore induces procyclicality in monetary policy. 
The other explanation considers inflation targeting. Under this explanation, we see 
procyclical monetary policy as an increase in capital inflow appreciates the exchange rate, 
eases pressure on prices, and consequently leads to a reduction in the domestic interest 
rate. Similarly, capital outflow would depreciate the exchange rate, causing pressure on 
prices and subsequently forcing policy makers to increase domestic interest rates. 
  3III. Empirical Approach 
Do Countries Engage in Procyclical Fiscal and Monetary Policy? 
This paper addresses two questions. The first is whether developing countries practice 
procyclical fiscal and monetary policies. Clearly endogeneity is an important issue when 
investigating the relationship between policy and growth. While we are interested in 
determining whether economies practice procyclical fiscal and monetary policy, we need 
to be aware of possible endogeneity arising from the fact that there may be a positive 
correlation due to short-run effects of policy on growth. We address this problem of 
endogeneity using two econometric approaches: generalized methods of moments – 
instrumental variable (GMM-IV), which allows us to analyze the contemporaneous 
relationship between policy and economic growth; and Vector Autoregression (VAR) 
estimation, an approach which allows us to deal with the dynamics in macroeconomic 
time series. 
In the case of testing fiscal policy, we use a GMM-IV version of the equation estimated by 
Gavin and Perotti (1997), where we use a lag of GDP growth to instrument for the 
endogenous regressor in the following structural equation: 
Policyt = α0  + α1∆GDPt  + α2Policyt-1  + α3Xt +εt                        (1) 
where policyt is fiscal policy at time t as measured by the primary surplus, defined as 
budget surplus minus nominal interest paid as percentage of GDP, and Xt represents a 
vector of control variables.
2  
With this identification strategy we are solving the endogeneity problem by instrumenting 
based on timing. Equation (1) imposes a structural relationship between growth and 
policy, and through our choice of instrument, we are essentially assuming lagged growth is 
exogenous with respect to current policy. Given the use of annual data this is a fairly 
reasonable assumption. 
When testing monetary policy procyclicality we again employ equation (1), however 
policy is now monetary policy and is measured by the real money market interest rate or 
short-term treasury rate deflated by consumer price inflation.
3 Central banks can easily 
access and influence the money market interest rate and as a result this rate better reflects 
the intention of the monetary authority. We do not use other financial market rates, like 
lending and deposit rates as proxies, as previous analysis shows that lending and deposit 
rates do not necessarily follow monetary policy decisions.  
Equation (1) is estimated both with and without control variables. Our control variables 
include the change in oil prices in order to control for productivity shocks as well as the 
change in inflation as in Gavin and Perotti (1997).
4  
If governments in developing countries are using procyclical fiscal policy, we would 
expect α1 < 0, which can be interpreted as a reduction in GDP growth leads to an increase 
                                                           
2 We also estimated fiscal policy using the growth of government consumption. The results are generally 
consistent with those using the primary surplus.  
3 Governments do not decide real interest rates, the decision variable is nominal interest rates. However real 
rates are a better measure, and we follow Calderon and Schmidt-Hebel on this choice. It is worth noting 
though that this selection potentially contains an identification problem. Procyclical policy corresponds to a 
response to expected inflation that is greater than one (i.e. the Taylor principle), however inflation might end 
up being larger than expected and therefore ex-post real rates could fall rather than rise as the policy 
intended.  
4 Results are robust in both cases, and so we comment only on the results with controls.  
  4in the government primary surplus. Similarly, if governments are using procyclical 
monetary policy, we would expect α1 < 0, which can be interpreted as a reduction in 
growth leads to an increase in real interest rates. 
Following Gavin and Perotti (1997), we also estimate equation (1) with special attention to 
the state of the economy to investigate whether there is asymmetry in policy decisions 
depending on the state of the economy. We have defined the state of the economy based 
on whether or not GDP growth is above or below a linear time trend.
5  The resulting 
equation is as follows: 
 
Policyt = α0 + α1 (∆GDPt*Dgood) + α2(∆GDPt*Dbad) + α3Policyt-1 + α4Xt + εt        (2) 
Where Dgood captures growth above the linear time trend, and Dbad captures growth below 
the linear time trend. Our second method employed, to capture dynamics, is the Vector 
Autoregression model, which is as follows: 
∑
=
+ + − + ∑
= − + =
∑
=
+ + − + ∑
= − + =
ρ
1 p 2t ε t X 24 p t Policy 23p
ρ
1 p p t ∆GDP 22p 21 t ∆GDP
ρ
1 p 1t ε t X 14 p t Policy 13p
ρ
1 p p t ∆GDP 12p 11 t Policy
α α α α
α α α α
          (3) 
where policy and controls variables are the same as in our GMM estimations. We expect 
the signs in the first equation of our VAR to be similar to those explained for the GMM 
estimation, while the second equation gives us an idea of the economic and statistical 
significance that the feedback of policy would have on economic growth in the next 
period. The VAR approach is less structural than the IV approach, but by being more 
general in terms of timing (lags of growth can affect policy), it shows the robustness of the 
IV results. To check whether policy depends on the state of the economy, we also estimate 
equation (3) based on growth above and below a linear time trend as discussed for 
equation (2).  
Do Capital Flows Impact Policy Decisions? 
The second question we address is whether capital flows have a direct impact on policy 
decisions. Here, we consider that policy is affected by movements in capital flows, but 
also can give feedback to capital flows. Our concern with endogenous regressors is the 
same as in our investigation of procyclical policy, and therefore we use the same approach 
discussed over the previous pages. We use GMM-IV estimators for the contemporaneous 
correlation and VAR to investigate the dynamic relationship between policy and capital 
flows. This is summarized in equation (4) below 
 
Policyt = α0  + α1Capital Flowst  + α2Policyt-1  + α3Xt +εt,                         (4) 
 
where capital flowst-1 is used to instrument for capital flowst, and our controls variables 
are the change in inflation and oil prices. 
Again, with this sort of identification strategy, we are assuming that lagged capital flows 
are exogenous with respect to current policy. Essentially we are assuming that financial 
agents are not anticipating future policy in making their current economic decisions. In 
                                                           
5 It is worth noting our definition of good and bad states based on a time trend proved to be generally in line 
with that using the Hodrik Prescott filter. For sensitivity purposes, we also used the dummy definition 
employed by Gavin and Perotti (1997) and found similar results to our time trend results. 
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from current policy that agents are not anticipating. Given the use of annual data again this 
is a reasonable assumption. 
Further, our VAR model is as follows 
∑
=
+ + − + ∑
= − + =
∑
=
+ + − + ∑
= − + =
ρ
1 p 2t ε t X 23 p t Policy 22p
ρ
1 p p t Flow   Capital 21p 20 t Flow   Capital
ρ
1 p 1t ε t X 13 p t Policy 12p
ρ
1 p p t Flow   Capital 11p 10 t Policy
α α α α
α α α α
    (5) 
with the same controls Xt as in GMM-IV estimation. 
The expected signs are similar to those detailed in our procyclical policy tests.6 A negative 
parameter on capital flows would suggest that capital inflows have a “procyclical” impact 
on fiscal policy.7 In the case of monetary policy, a negative parameter would indicate that 
an increase in capital inflow reduces real interest rates, characterizing a procyclical 
impact. To address whether capital flows impact policy differently according to the state 
of the economy, we also apply to equations (4) and (5) the same transformation seen in 
equation (2). 
It is worth noting that our IV approach and VAR approach discussed over the previous 
pages are quite related and both correspond to a Granger-causality type test. Assuming 
that current growth (capital flows) is positively related to lagged growth (capital flows), 
then a test of the sign of the lags in the VAR is the same as the IV test. That is, IV using 
the lag is essentially like regressing policy on lagged growth (capital flows) with the 
relationship between current and past growth taken into account as is done in a VAR set-
up. 
IV. Data and Empirical Evidence 
The Data 
As in previous work in this literature we use annual data to test for procyclical policy in 
Latin America. The countries considered are Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico. In 
order to contrast these results with developed country results we also investigate fiscal and 
monetary policy for the United States as well as the United Kingdom.  
Our dataset spans from 1970 to 2000, and is based on data from the World Bank’s Global 
Development Finance 2003 CD-ROM and World Development Indicators 2002 CD-ROM 
as well as the IMF’s International Financial Statistics and Government Financial Statistics 
Yearbook.8  
The primary surplus is generally measured by subtracting nominal interest paid from the 
overall budget of the central government. In the case of Brazil we use general government 
that includes state enterprises and local governments. Our measure of monetary policy is 
measured as the real money market interest rate (or short term treasury rate) deflated by 
CPI. Lastly, our aggregate measure of net capital flow is created by adding net transfer on 
debt (all flows minus interest payments), net flow on foreign direct investment and on 
portfolio investment, and subtracting profit remittances.9 We also use a measure of private 
                                                           
6 Once capital flows are procyclical, an increase in capital flows is positively correlated with GDP growth. 
7 This means an increase in capital inflows leads to a loose policy. 
8 When necessary, data was also collected from the respective country’s central bank or Finance Ministry. 
9 These data are not available for the US and UK in the Global Development Finance dataset. Therefore we 
measure net capital flow as the sum of the current account deficit with changes in international reserves.  
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for robustness. Both measures of net capital flow provide similar results, though with 
different levels of statistical significance. We use the first measure (normalized by 
exports) for the analysis detailed in this paper.  
 
Econometric Considerations 
Given the use of time series analysis, stationarity of the series is checked using the 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test with a maximum lag length of four. We use the 10% 
level of significance to reject the unit root. We also use the 10% level of significance in 
order to reject the null hypothesis that a parameter equals zero (no relationship) in our 
estimations.  
For the VAR estimations we use the Schwarz information criterion to choose the lag 
length. This criterion tends to indicate the lowest-lag Vector Autoregression, which is 
preferable when dealing with a short span of data such as ours. We also use White’s 






The fiscal policy results which follow for Argentina as well as the other countries under 
consideration are based on the fiscal policy variable in first differences. However in order 
to bring as much evidence to bear on this question, estimates using the fiscal policy 
measure in levels (where stationary) are also available. These results can be found in the 
appendix.  
On the basic question of the cyclicality of fiscal policy, the results in the second column of 
Table 1 indicate that for both the non-state dependent GMM and non-state dependent 
VAR results there is no statistical evidence that GDP growth affects Argentina’s primary 








                                                           
10  It is possible that privatizations implemented during the 1990’s in Argentina are influencing our results 
via their impact on the primary surplus. The financial gains from privatization are not considered fiscal 
revenue in the calculation of the fiscal deficit. With Argentina’a broad privatization process, it is possible 
that the income generated from this process isolated the fiscal policy from behaving in a procyclical way and 
from depending on external funds (even though part of the privatization funds came from foreign direct 
investment and so are counted in the capital inflow measure). 
  7Table 1: Testing for Procyclical Fiscal Policy and the Influence of Capital Flows: Argentina  
Fiscal Policy  Fiscal Policy 
GMM  Effect of Growth  GMM  Effect of Capital Flows 
Non-state dependent  0.000  Non-state dependent  -0.029** 
State dependent (good)  1.786  State dependent (good)  -0.035** 
State dependent (bad)  -2.374  State dependent (bad)  -0.020 
VAR  VAR  
Non-state dependent  0.000  Non-state dependent  -0.015* 
State dependent (good)  0.059  State dependent (good)  -0.016* 
State dependent (bad)  -0.188*  State dependent (bad)  -0.010 
*,**,*** indicates 90%, 95%, 99% significance 
Concerning capital flows and fiscal policy, both GMM and VAR non-state dependent 
results suggest international capital influences the primary surplus in a procyclical 
direction. The state dependent results also suggest that capital flows impact fiscal policy 
(though with the caveat of significance only during the good state). 
Monetary Policy 
Table 2: Testing for Procyclical Monetary Policy and the Influence of Capital Flows: Argentina 
Monetary Policy  Monetary Policy 
GMM  Effect of Growth  GMM  Effect of Capital Flows 
Non-state dependent  -7.168**  Non-state dependent  -0.6826* 
State dependent (good)  293.51  State dependent (good)  -0.684* 
State dependent (bad)  -574.92  State dependent (bad)  -0.680** 
VAR  VAR  
Non-state dependent  -2.814**  Non-state dependent  -0.329* 
State dependent (good)  -2.382*  State dependent (good)  -0.278* 
State dependent (bad)  -4.074  State dependent (bad)  -0.700* 
*,**,*** indicates 90%, 95%, 99% significance 
Turning to monetary policy, the GMM and VAR results of Table 2 indicate procyclical 
monetary policy for Argentina. For the non-state dependent results, the negative sign on 
GDP growth points toward an increase in the real interest rate when there is a reduction in 
GDP growth and vice-versa. When examining policy in different states of the economy, 
we do not identify any statistically significant relation in the GMM results, while the VAR 
results indicate procyclical monetary policy during good times. The investigation of the 
direct effect of capital flows on monetary policy presents the expected negative sign 
(higher capital inflow lowers interest rate) in both GMM and VAR estimations. The 
results based on different states of the economy also suggest that capital inflow always 
impact monetary policy in a procyclical direction. 
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Fiscal Policy 
The results of equation (1) using the primary surplus in levels show statistically weak 
evidence of procyclical policy, even the though signs are in the expected direction.
11 
However, for first differences (where the effect of GDP growth is on the change of fiscal 
policy), there is strong and consistent evidence that the primary surplus moves in a 
procyclical manner as seen in Table 3. 
Table 3: Testing for Procyclical Fiscal Policy and the Influence of Capital Flows: Brazil  
Fiscal Policy  Fiscal Policy 
GMM  Effect of Growth  GMM  Effect of Capital Flows 
Non-state dependent  -0.597**  Non-state dependent  0.848 
State dependent (good)  -0.468*  State dependent (good)  -1.566 
State dependent (bad)  -1.022*  State dependent (bad)  2.988 
VAR  VAR  
Non-state dependent  -0.435**  Non-state dependent  0.680 
State dependent (good)  -0.587*  State dependent (good)  -1.002 
State dependent (bad)  -0.266  State dependent (bad)  2.168 
*,**,*** indicates 90%, 95%, 99% significance 
The non-state dependent GMM and VAR results both point to procyclical fiscal policy. 
For different states of the economy, the GMM results suggest that fiscal policy is always 
procyclical, while the VAR results indicate support for procyclical policy only during 
good times. In the case of the effect of capital flows on fiscal policy, there does not appear 




Table 4: Testing for Procyclical Monetary Policy and the Influence of Capital Flows: Brazil 
Monetary Policy  Monetary Policy 
GMM  Effect of Growth  GMM  Effect of Capital Flows 
Non-state dependent  -2.987**  Non-state dependent  -19.392** 
State dependent (good)  -1.833*  State dependent (good)  -17.775* 
State dependent (bad)  -14.808  State dependent (bad)  -42.201* 
VAR  VAR  
Non-state dependent  -1.432*  Non-state dependent  -17.037*** 
State dependent (good)  -1.215*  State dependent (good)  -15.803* 
State dependent (bad)  -1.824*  State dependent (bad)  -32.297 
*,**,*** indicates 90%, 95%, 99% significance 
                                                           
11 See the appendix for these results. Also recall that for the case of Brazil we use a measure of general 
government for the Brazilian primary surplus using data from the IMF and Central Bank of Brazil.  
  9In the case of Brazilian monetary policy, the non-state dependent GMM as well as VAR 
results support the notion of procyclical monetary policy, in which the real interest rate 
increases when the country faces a reduction on growth. Allowing for different states of 
the economy, again, the evidence is supportive of procyclical monetary policy. The 
resultss for different states show that monetary policy is procyclical regardless of whether 
the country is in a good or in a bad state. The results for equations (5) and (6) provide 
evidence that capital flows directly affect real interest rates in Brazil. Both the GMM and 
the VAR estimations indicate that an increase in capital inflows leads to a decrease in real 
interest rates and vice-versa. The data show that this impact is for the most part 




The GMM results of Table 5 fail to find any significant relation between GDP growth and 
Chilean fiscal policy, as is the case for the VAR results, regardless of whether we consider 
the non-state dependent or state-dependent cases. However the VAR results using levels 
for the fiscal policy measure do provide strong support for countercyclical fiscal policy.
13  
Table 5: Testing for Procyclical Fiscal Policy and the Influence of Capital Flows: Chile 
Fiscal Policy  Fiscal Policy 
GMM  Effect of Growth  GMM  Effect of Capital Flows 
Non-state dependent  -0.015  Non-state dependent  -0.090** 
State dependent (good)  0.070  State dependent (good)  -0.065*** 
State dependent (bad)  -0.228  State dependent (bad)  -0.116 
VAR  VAR  
Non-state dependent  -0.005  Non-state dependent  -0.043* 
State dependent (good)  0.021  State dependent (good)  -0.040 
State dependent (bad)  -0.067  State dependent (bad)  -0.046** 
*,**,*** indicates 90%, 95%, 99% significance 
 
It is possible that the fund for the stabilization of copper prices may explain the ability of 
Chile to implement the countercyclical fiscal policy identified in the levels results in this 
study. This fund, created in 1985, saves resources when the price of copper is above a 
threshold, which are then used when copper prices are below the threshold. Even though 
the relative importance of copper revenue has declined in the Chilean public budget 
throughout the 1990s, it accounted for almost 30% of all fiscal revenue during the late 
1980s. The capital controls implemented by Chile during this period may also be 
influencing our findings.
14 
It is interesting to note, however, that even though there is no evidence that Chile follows 
procyclical fiscal policy, the data indicates that net capital flows have a direct impact on 
policy. An increase in capital inflows helps predict a loosening of fiscal policy. This 
evidence is captured by both approaches. This says that fiscal policy in Chile reacts to 
                                                           
12 Due to the short sample available for Chilean interest rates, we investigate only fiscal policy for Chile. 
13 This is the case for non-state and state dependent results. See the appendix for more on these results. 
14 Kaminsky, Reinhart, and Vegh (2004, pp. 31-32) suggest the adoption of fiscal rules designed to promote 
public saving in good times may have contributed to these type of findings. 
  10capital inflows in the direction the recent literature suggest, but this behavior is not 




The non-state dependent GMM and the VAR results of Table 6 indicate that Mexico 
practices procyclical fiscal policy.
 The results based on good and bad states also show 
signs that Mexico follows procyclical policy in both states, however we find statistically 
significant evidence of procyclical policy only from our VAR results during low-growth 
periods. 
Table 6: Testing for Procyclical Fiscal Policy and the Influence of Capital Flows: Mexico 
Fiscal Policy  Fiscal Policy 
GMM  Effect of Growth  GMM  Effect of Capital Flows 
Non-state dependent  -0.743*  Non-state dependent  -0.093** 
State dependent (good)  -0.052  State dependent (good)  -0.004 
State dependent (bad)  -7.133  State dependent (bad)  -0.178*** 
VAR  VAR  
Non-state dependent  -0.272***  Non-state dependent  -0.060** 
State dependent (good)  -0.220  State dependent (good)  -0.040 
State dependent (bad)  -0.483**  State dependent (bad)  -0.085* 
*,**,*** indicates 90%, 95%, 99% significance 
Investigating the impact of capital inflows on fiscal policy, we find that the non-state 
dependent GMM and VAR results provide support that capital flows affect the primary 
surplus in a procyclical direction. The results for different states of the economy indicate a 




In Table 7, we find little evidence of procyclical monetary policy for Mexico. Both the 
GMM and VAR results have mostly countercyclical signs, although they are not 
statistically significant. The results concerning policy in different states have 
countercyclical signs in periods of high growth and procyclical signs in periods of low 
growth but, again, they are not statistically significant. The effect of capital inflows on real 
interest rates is also not statistically significant, although the parameters are consistently 
negative for all estimates. Examining policy in different states, we find evidence that 





  11Table 7: Testing for Procyclical Monetary Policy and the Influence of Capital Flows: Mexico 
Monetary Policy  Monetary Policy 
GMM  Effect of Growth  GMM  Effect of Capital Flows 
Non-state dependent  0.489  Non-state dependent  -0.024 
State dependent (good)  0.520  State dependent (good)  0.113 
State dependent (bad)  -1.741  State dependent (bad)  -0.375 
VAR  VAR  
Non-state dependent  0.152  Non-state dependent  -0.014 
State dependent (good)  0.215  State dependent (good)  0.054 
State dependent (bad)  -0.047  State dependent (bad)  -0.134** 
*,**,*** indicates 90%, 95%, 99% significance 
Mexico may be a case where the authorities act to increase interest rates during bad times 
to fight capital outflows, but it is possible that the increase in inflation ends up being larger 
than the increase in nominal interest rates, resulting in an ex-post decrease in real interest 
rates. In fact, having taken a look at nominal interest rates, it appears Mexico has 
increased nominal interest rate during particularly bad times (particularly during the 1982 
and 1995 crises). 
USA 
Fiscal Policy 
For comparison sake, we also provide results for two developed countries, the US and 
United Kingdom. The US non-state dependent GMM results of Table 8 do not show 
statistically significant evidence of a relationship between fiscal policy and economic 
growth, though the non-state dependent VAR results do provide evidence of 
countercyclical policy. The results (both GMM and VAR) based on different states show 
statistically significant evidence that the US implements countercyclical fiscal policy 
during good times. 
Table 8: Testing for Procyclical Fiscal Policy and the Influence of Capital Flows: USA 
Fiscal Policy  Fiscal Policy 
GMM  Effect of Growth  GMM  Effect of Capital Flows 
Non-state dependent  1.039  Non-state dependent  1.519 
State dependent (good)  0.512**  State dependent (good)  2.566** 
State dependent (bad)  -3.256  State dependent (bad)  -8.379** 
VAR  VAR  
Non-state dependent  0.300*  Non-state dependent  1.363 
State dependent (good)  0.288**  State dependent (good)  2.039** 
State dependent (bad)  0.84  State dependent (bad)  -3.907* 
*,**,*** indicates 90%, 95%, 99% significance 
Concerning the influence of capital flows on fiscal policy, both GMM and VAR non-state 
dependent results show signs that capital flows impact fiscal policy in a countercyclical 
direction, but this is not statistically significant. Looking at the asymmetric impact, we 
  12find that capital flows affect policy in a countercyclical direction during good times and in 
a procyclical direction during bad times. 
 
Monetary Policy 
We find no statistically significant relation between monetary policy and economic growth 
in the US. Both the non-state dependent GMM and VAR results have countercyclical 
signs, but are not statistically significant. The results concerning policy in different states 
have a countercyclical sign in periods of high growth and a procyclical sign in periods of 
low growth but again, none of these are statistically significant. 
The non-state dependent results for the effect of capital inflows on real interest rates do 
not provide statistically significant results, although the parameter estimates do indicate a 
countercyclical direction. With different states, capital flows appear to impact monetary 
policy in a countercyclical direction in the good state based on our VAR estimates. 
 
Table 9: Testing for Procyclical Monetary Policy and the Influence of Capital Flows: USA 
Monetary Policy  Monetary Policy 
GMM  Effect of Growth  GMM  Effect of Capital Flows 
Non-state dependent  0.984  Non-state dependent  3.246 
State dependent (good)  0.404  State dependent (good)  3.331 
State dependent (bad)  -2.351  State dependent (bad)  -3.567 
VAR  VAR  
Non-state dependent  0.182  Non-state dependent  2.330 
State dependent (good)  0.193  State dependent (good)  2.795*** 
State dependent (bad)  -0.014  State dependent (bad)  -2.176 




In Table 10, both non-state dependent GMM and VAR results prove to be statistically 
insignificant though possess the correct sign for countercyclical fiscal policy in the UK.
15 
When considering good and bad states of the economy, the evidence is statistically 
significant for the good state. Investigating the direct impact of capital inflow on fiscal 





                                                           
15 Levels evidence provides statistically significant support for countercyclical fiscal policy beyond that in 
table 10. 
  13Table 10: Testing for Procyclical Fiscal Policy and the Influence of Capital Flows: UK 
Fiscal Policy  Fiscal Policy 
GMM  Effect of Growth  GMM  Effect of Capital Flows 
Non-state dependent  0.431  Non-state dependent  -17.855 
State dependent (good)  0.427***  State dependent (good)  2.654 
State dependent (bad)  -0.540  State dependent (bad)  -17.840* 
VAR  VAR  
Non-state dependent  0.240  Non-state dependent  -6.238** 
State dependent (good)  0.345***  State dependent (good)  -1.645 
State dependent (bad)  0.131  State dependent (bad)  -13.945* 
*,**,*** indicates 90%, 95%, 99% significance 
Monetary Policy 
Finally, in the case of UK monetary policy, the evidence suggests the UK follows 
countercyclical monetary policy. This evidence is supported by both GMM and VAR 
estimations. The GMM results for different states of the economy show evidence of 
countercyclical monetary policy during good times, but the VAR estimations suggest that 
it is valid in both states. We find no statistically significant evidence of any relationship 
between capital flows and monetary policy in the UK 
 
Table 11: Testing for Procyclical Monetary Policy and the Influence of Capital Flows: UK 
Monetary Policy  Monetary Policy 
GMM  Effect of Growth  GMM  Effect of Capital Flows 
Non-state dependent  0.687*  Non-state dependent  -0.434 
State dependent (good)  0.595*  State dependent (good)  7.319 
State dependent (bad)  -0.960  State dependent (bad)  -3.347 
VAR  VAR  
Non-state dependent  0.328*  Non-state dependent  -0.155 
State dependent (good)  0.470*  State dependent (good)  2.043 
State dependent (bad)  0.148***  State dependent (bad)  -3.683 
*,**,*** indicates 90%, 95%, 99% significance 
V. Concluding Comments 
This paper addresses two questions. First is there empirical evidence that developing 
countries practice procyclical fiscal and monetary policy? Second, do capital flows impact 
policy decisions in these countries?  Using a sample of four Latin American countries, we 
find evidence suggesting yes to both questions, though not unequivocally. For our first 
question, we find they do practice procyclical fiscal and monetary policy, though Chile is 
an exception when it comes to fiscal policy, where it is countercyclical, and Mexico is the 
exception for monetary policy. For the second question we find that capital flows 
generally have a procyclical impact on policy decisions in these countries.  Our results 
suggest capital inflows impact fiscal policy for three of our four countries. We also find 
  14some evidence that monetary policy is directly influenced by capital inflows for all 
developing countries studied.  
Comparing these results to the developed country benchmark, we find the evidence 
suggests both the US and UK follow countercyclical fiscal policy and that the latter 
engages in countercyclical monetary policy. Taken with our Latin American finding, this 
suggests developing countries adopt procyclical monetary and fiscal policy in contrast 
with what we see in developed nations. This is in line with what has been suggested by the 
earlier literature. This study also suggests that capital flows have a strong influence on the 
policy direction.  
An immediate conclusion we draw is the fact that Chile appears to follow countercyclical 
policy may be evidence of the efficiency of some kind of fiscal saving mechanism during 
good times, which enables Chile to implement countercyclical policy. Regarding the 
impact of capital flows, a possible conclusion of these findings is that some prudential 
regulation in capital mobility may help reduce the destabilizing effect of fiscal and 
monetary policy and so reduce macroeconomic volatility in these countries over the short 
run. Others in the literature have advocated this solution, as seen in Espinosa-Vega et al. 
(2000), Carvalho (2000), and Ocampo (2003). Over the longer run, the solution may 
require measures that help develop the domestic financial system, reducing the existence 
of credit constraints, as detailed by Ferreira da Silva (2002). 
These findings suggest the robustness of many of the literature’s earlier results for fiscal 
policy, as taking the GMM approach to deal with the problem of endogenous regressors 
has yielded results largely consistent with earlier findings. As well, they provide additional 
empirical support for the procyclical monetary policy literature. We suggest for further 
research more could be done to incorporate more developing countries and compare 
regional policy responses to movements in capital flows. 
  15Appendix: Results for Levels Fiscal Policy Measure 
 
Table 12: Testing for Procyclical Fiscal Policy and the Influence of Capital Flows: Brazil  
Fiscal Policy  Fiscal Policy 
GMM  Effect of Growth  GMM  Effect of Capital Flows 
Non-state dependent  -0.902  Non-state dependent  -2.764 
State dependent (good)  -0.781  State dependent (good)  -9.840 
State dependent (bad)  -1.458  State dependent (bad)  4.383 
VAR  VAR  
Non-state dependent  -0.225**  Non-state dependent  5.850 
State dependent (good)  -0.275  State dependent (good)  -6.391 
State dependent (bad)  -0.160  State dependent (bad)  2.784 
*,**,*** indicates 90%, 95%, 99% significance 
 
Table 13: Testing for Procyclical Fiscal Policy and the Influence of Capital Flows: Chile 
Fiscal Policy  Fiscal Policy 
GMM  Effect of Growth  GMM  Effect of Capital Flows 
Non-state dependent  1.151  Non-state dependent  -0.10 
State dependent (good)  2.216  State dependent (good)  -0.009 
State dependent (bad)  6.843  State dependent (bad)  -0.139 
VAR  VAR  
Non-state dependent  0.157*; 0.132*  Non-state dependent  -0.005; -0.034* 
State dependent (good)  0.182*  State dependent (good)  0.005 
State dependent (bad)  0.065  State dependent (bad)  -0.060* 
*,**,*** indicates 90%, 95%, 99% significance 
Note: the inclusion of more than one coefficient is indicative of more than 1 lag. 
 
Table 14: Testing for Procyclical Fiscal Policy and the Influence of Capital Flows: UK 
Fiscal Policy  Fiscal Policy 
GMM  Effect of Growth  GMM  Effect of Capital Flows 
Non-state dependent  0.799**  Non-state dependent  -11.855 
State dependent (good)  0.674*  State dependent (good)  -3.627 
State dependent (bad)  -1.146  State dependent (bad)  -20.690* 
VAR  VAR  
Non-state dependent  0.412*  Non-state dependent  -3.025 
State dependent (good)  0.535*  State dependent (good)  1.227 
State dependent (bad)  0.214  State dependent (bad)  -9.973*** 
*,**,*** indicates 90%, 95%, 99% significance 
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